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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
Burdene and Unior Shores, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
District Court No. 050100099 
Court of Appeals No. 20050291-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the trial court properly dismissed Burdene Shores's counterclaim for bad 
faith, concluding that Mrs. Shores was a third-party claimant and Liberty Mutual owed her no 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
B. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that an insurer may limit coverage for 
members of an insured household in an automobile policy of insurance above the statutory 
mandated coverage amounts. 
C. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the household exclusion in the Liberty 
Mutual policy of insurance clearly and unmistakably communicated to the insureds the 
circumstances under which coverage would be limited under the policy. 
D. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the household exclusion in the Liberty 
Mutual policy of insurance is not in violation of public policy or state statute. 
E. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Shores's Rule 56(f) 
motion for a continuance to conduct further discovery. 
F. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the validity of the household exclusion 
is a legal issue to be decided by the court. 
II. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). "'In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an 
appellate court views "the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness.'"" Black v. Allstate Ins. Co., 100 P.3d 1163, 1166 (Utah 2004) (citations omitted). 
"A trial court's ruling on a motion for continuance under rule 56(f) is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard." Riddle v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 105 P.3d 970, 973 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2004). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Constitution article I, § 18 
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall 
be passed." 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102(7) (2002) 
"The purposes of the Insurance Code are to maintain freedom of contract and enterprise." 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-304(l)(a) (2002) 
(See Addendum to the Brief of Appellee) 
Rule 56(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(See Addendum to the Brief of Appellee) 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(See Addendum to the Brief of Appellee) 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(See Addendum to the Brief of Appellee) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the validity of a household exclusion in Liberty Mutual's automobile 
insurance policy issued to Unior and Burdene Shores. 
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II. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
On February 9, 2004, Liberty Mutual filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court seeking to enforce a "step down" or "household exclusion" in its 
automobile policy of insurance which would limit liability coverage to $25,000. (Complaint for 
Declaratory Relief; R.6). On February 13, 2004, the trial court granted Liberty Mutual's ex parte 
request to deposit $25,000 into the court trust fund to be held pending the outcome of the 
litigation. (Order to Deposit Money in Court; R.7). 
On March 17, 2004, Liberty Mutual filed an amended complaint for declaratory relief. 
(Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief; R.18). On March 25, 2004, Defendant Burdene 
Shores filed an answer to Liberty Mutual's amended complaint and included a counterclaim 
against Liberty Mutual. (Answer and Counterclaim; R.80). Mrs. Shores's counterclaim included 
Count I for declaratory judgment and Count II for bad faith refusal to settle. (Id.; R.63-78). 
Unior Shores also filed an answer that included a bad faith counterclaim. 
Liberty Mutual subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Mrs. Shores's bad faith 
counterclaim. (Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss Defendant 
Burdene Shores's Bad Faith Counterclaim; R.106). After a hearing on the Motion, the trial court 
granted Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss on August 27, 2004. (Order and Final Judgment to 
Dismiss Burdene Shores's Counterclaim of Bad Faith; R.230). 
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On September 16, 2005, Liberty Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment on its 
declaratory judgement action, and for a dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim in Mrs. 
Shores's counterclaim, as well as any declaratory cause of action alleged in Mr. Shores's 
counterclaim against Liberty Mutual. (Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Declaratory Judgment Action; R.233). On December 10, 2004, the trial 
court heard oral argument on Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment. (Order and Final 
Judgment Granting Liberty Mutual's Motion for Summary Judgment on Declaratory Judgment 
Action, and Denying Defendant Burdene Shores's Rule 56(f) Motion; R.443). On the same day 
of the hearing, Mr. Shores filed a motion for summary judgment. (Unior Shores's Motion and 
Memorandum for Summary Judgment; R.429).1 In addition, at the beginning of the hearing on 
December 10, 2004, Mrs. Shores orally made a motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to conduct further discovery before a decision on Liberty Mutual's 
motion for summary judgment. (Order and Final Judgment; R.433-47). 
The trial court subsequently granted Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment on 
its amended complaint for declaratory relief and further dismissed the causes of action for 
declaratory relief alleged in Unior and Burdene Shoreses' counterclaims. (Order and Final 
Judgment; R.443, 437-38). In addition, the trial court denied Mrs. Shores's Rule 56(f) motion 
for a continuance to conduct further discovery. (Id; R.443, 437). 
1
 Mr. Shores did not file a memorandum in opposition to Liberty Mutual's motion for 
summary judgment. (Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's Response to Defendant 
Unior Shores's Motion for Summary Judgment; R.433-35). 
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Mr. and Mrs. Shores subsequently filed their notices of appeal. (Notice of Appeal; 
R.452). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 9, 2003, Burdene Shores was involved in an automobile accident in 
which she was a passenger and her husband, Unior Shores, was driving the motor vehicle. 
(Order and Final Judgment Granting Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Declaratory Judgment Action, and Denying Defendant Burdene Shores' 
Rule 56(f) Motion; R.442). Mrs. Shores allegedly sustained personal injuries in the collision. 
(Id). 
2. The automobile involved in the collision was insured under a personal automobile 
policy issued by Liberty Mutual, with coverage from January 12, 2003, to January 12, 2004. 
(Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2; R.17; LibertyGuard Auto Policy; R. 256, 271). 
Mr. and Mrs. Shores are both named insureds under the policy. (Id.). The policy provides bodily 
injury liability coverage of $100,000 for each person and $300,000 per accident. (Order and 
Final Judgment at 2; R.442; LibertyGuard Auto Policy; R.256). 
3. As a result of the accident and her injuries, Mrs. Shores filed a lawsuit against her 
husband in a separate action for negligence in an attempt to collect benefits under the liability 
coverage of the Liberty Mutual policy. (Order and Final Judgment at 3; R.441). 
4. Liberty Mutual's policy contains a "step-down" or "household exclusion" in an 
endorsement to the policy, Endorsement PP 01 93 040 2. (Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
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Relief at 2-3; R.16-17; Liberty Guard Auto Policy; R. 245). At the top of the Endorsement is 
written, "THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT 
CAREFULLY." {Id). The title also provides that it is an "AMENDMENT OF POLICY 
PROVISIONS -UTAH." {Id). The provision then states as follows: 
I. Part A - Liability Coverage 
Part A is amended as follows: 
B. The following exclusion is added: 
We do not provide Liability Coverage for any "insured" for "bodily 
injury" to you to the extent that the limits of liability for this 
coverage exceed the applicable minimum limits for liability 
specified by UTAH CODE ANN. Section 31A-22-304. The 
applicable minimum limits are: 
1. $65,000 for each accident, if the limit of liability for this coverage 
is a single limit that applies for each accident; or 
2. $25,000 for each person/$50,000 for each accident, if the limit of 
liability for this coverage is indicated as a split limit. 
(LibertyGuard Auto Policy; R.245). 
5. The above-referenced exclusion operates to limit the amount Mrs. Shores can recover 
under the policy for her husband's negligence to $25,000. The policy provision limiting 
insurance to "$25,000 for each person" is equal in amount to the Utah statutory minimum 
coverage found in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-304 (2002). 
6. The Liberty Mutual policy of insurance was delivered to Mr. and Mrs. Shores on or 
about January 16, 2003. (Answer and Counterclaim at 3; R.78). 
7. Mrs. Shores previously demanded that Liberty Mutual pay $100,000 in liability limits 
under the Liberty Mutual automobile policy as a result of the aforementioned accident. (Order 
and Final Judgment at 3; R.441). Liberty Mutual denied Mrs. Shores's demand based on the 
household exclusion but offered to pay $25,000 in exchange for a release. (Id.). 
8. As a result of this dispute in coverage, Liberty Mutual filed its complaint for 
declaratory relief on February 9, 2004, seeking to enforce the household exclusion in its 
automobile policy. (Complaint for Declaratory Relief; R.6). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Mrs. Shores was not in privity of contract with Liberty Mutual in her claim against the 
policy for liability coverage. Mrs. Shores was a third-party claimant rather than a first-party 
claimant because her claim against the policy arose out of her husband's negligence. Therefore, 
under Utah law, Liberty Mutual owed her no duty of good faith and fair dealing. As a result, the 
trial court correctly dismissed Mrs. Shores's counterclaim for bad faith. 
II. Utah Code section 31 A-21-308(l) does not require Liberty Mutual to list an insured 
as a separate risk in its insurance policy. Mrs. Shores misconstrues the statute. The household 
exclusion is not a differing risk but is an exclusion to the liability coverage of the policy. 
Furthermore, even if the household exclusion did constitute another risk, section 31 A-21-308(l) 
permits insurers to limit the coverage available to an insured, as long as that limitation is clearly 
stated. Liberty Mutual's policy clearly provides that Mr. Shores's coverage was limited to 
$25,000 for bodily injury under the household exclusion. 
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III. Mrs. Shores erroneously argues that the household exclusion violates public policy 
found in Utah case and statutory law. To the contrary, the household exclusion is supported by 
all three measures of public policy, including case law, statutory law, and the constitutional right 
to contract. The Utah Appellate Courts have consistently held that insurers are free to limit and 
exclude coverage in automobile insurance policies in amounts that are above the statutory 
minimum limits required by state law. The majority of Courts from around the country have 
upheld household exclusions where the coverage is not reduced below the mandatory limits set 
by state law. This is consistent with the policies and guidelines set forth in the Utah Insurance 
Code and Utah State Constitution which seek to promote and maintain freedom of contract and 
enterprise. 
IV. The trial court correctly found that the household exclusion in the Liberty Mutual 
automobile insurance policy clearly and unmistakably communicates to the insureds the 
circumstances under which coverage will be limited under the policy. Liberty MutuaPs 
household exclusion unambiguously limits the amount of motor vehicle liability coverage to 
$25,000 when an insured spouse brings a personal injury claim against his or her insured spouse 
for negligence. The provision is clear, does not omit terms, and is not subject to multiple 
meanings. Moreover, the law does not require Liberty Mutual to place the household exclusion 
on the declarations page, nor is it ambiguous because it reduces the coverage stated on the 
declarations page. 
9 
V. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mrs. Shores's Rule 56(f) motion 
for a continuance to conduct further discovery. The trial court was correct in denying the motion 
because Mrs. Shores did not adhere to the proper procedure in bringing the motion. The motion 
was raised for the first time at the hearing on Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment 
and no affidavit accompanied the motion. Second, the validity of the household exclusion is a 
legal question to be decided by the Court. As a result, no amount of discovery would have 
enabled the Shores to defeat Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment. Third, the 
evidence shows that there were no misrepresentations by Liberty Mutual's agent as to the terms 
of the policy. The coverage was the same under the Liberty Mutual policy as the Shoreses' 
previous policy with Metlife. The Metlife policy also contained a household exclusion which 
would have limited the available liability coverage the same as the exclusion in the Liberty 
Mutual policy. Fourth, the Rule 56(f) motion was also properly denied because the law in Utah 
does not require an insurance agent to disclose exclusions at the time of sale. The law also does 
not permit a court to invalidate a clear provision in an insurance policy even where the insurance 
agent knows that the insureds have a different expectation of coverage and helps to create those 
expectations. Finally, the Liberty Mutual policy was delivered to the Shores shortly after it 
became effective, at which time they had an obligation to review the policy and raise any 




AS A THIRD PARTY TO AN INSURANCE CONTRACT, MRS. 
SHORES'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR BAD FAITH IS NOT RECOGNIZED 
BY UTAH LAW. 
Mrs. Shores argues that the trial court improperly dismissed her counterclaim against 
Liberty Mutual for bad faith refusal to settle when it found that there was no privity of contract 
between Liberty Mutual and Mrs. Shores. Brief of Appellant Burdene Shores at 16-23. Contrary 
to Mrs. Shores's arguments, Utah law supports the trial court's dismissal of Mrs. Shores's 
counterclaim. 
We start with the well-established law in Utah which holds that "there is no duty of good 
faith and fair dealing imposed upon an insurer running to a third-party claimant." Pixton v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In Pixton, the plaintiffs 
automobile collided with another causing her physical injury. The injured plaintiff subsequently 
brought an action against the insurance company of the tortfeasor for breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 748. In Pixton, the Court noted: 
Contrasting first-party situations with third-party situations, we note that in a first-
party situation the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted by the insured for losses 
suffered by the insured. In a third-party situation, however, the insurer agrees to 
defend the insured against claims made by third-parties against the insured and to 
pay resulting liability up to a specified amount. 
Id. at 748 n.l (citing Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 n.2 (Utah 1985)). 
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In third-party situations, a fiduciary duty arises from the duty of good faith to the insured, 
not directly to the third-party claimant. As the Utah Court of Appeals explained, "[i]n order to 
maintain an action under a contractual theory of insurer bad faith, the parties must be in privity of 
contract at the time of the alleged wrong." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 958 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 430 P.2d 576, 577 (Utah 1967)). 
While "an insured ha[s] a right to expect his liability insurance company to represent the 
insured's interests by acting reasonably and in good faith in settling third-party claims against its 
insured," if there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the insurance company, it 
owes no duty. Pixton, 809 P.2d at 749 (citing Ammerman, 430 P.2d at 578). 
Similar to the facts in Pixton, Burdene Shores is a third-party claimant in this action 
against Liberty Mutual. Mrs. Shores is a third-party claimant because her claim against the 
policy for liability coverage arises out of her husband's negligence. Because she is not in privity 
of contract, the insurer owes her no fiduciary duty which would impose upon it a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
The case of Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah 1999), is directly on point. InSperry, 
the plaintiff claimed that because she was a named insured under the policy, she was a first-party 
claimant and owed a duty of good faith in all her dealings with the insurance company, even 
when she was suing a co-insured to obtain liability coverage under the policy. Sperry, 990 P.2d 
at 383. Specifically, plaintiff was suing her husband for the wrongful death of her son based on 
her husband's negligent driving, and she included a claim for bad faith against the insurer. Id. 
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The Sperry Court concluded that plaintiff had no standing to bring an action against the 
insurer. In arriving at its decision, the Sperry court stated as follows: "Annette's [plaintiff] 
wrongful death claim was not based upon her own coverage but on Robert's [plaintiffs husband] 
liability coverage for negligence. Therefore, she is properly considered a third party for good 
faith purposes." Id. at 384 (citing Rumley v. Allstate Indem. Co., 924 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1996) ("[B]ecause the plaintiffs claim was not based 'upon benefits payable to her under 
the policy, but upon her husband's tort liability to her for his negligence . . . she assumed the 
posture of a third-party claimant' by bringing a liability claim against her husband.")). 
Mrs. Shores attempts to confound the clarity of Sperry by arguing that she has a reduced 
right of recovery because of the household exclusion. Brief of Appellant Burdene Shores at 16-
23. Mrs. Shores further asserts that these alleged limited rights of recovery somehow circumvent 
her tort action and render her a first-party claimant against Liberty Mutual. Id. 
In Sperry, there was in fact a household exclusion provision and the insurer initially 
agreed to pay less in bodily injury coverage because of that provision. Sperry, 990 P.2d at 382. 
The insurer later determined that the household exclusion did not apply. Id. Contrary to Mrs. 
Shores's arguments, the existence of the household provision was completely irrelevant to the 
holding. The Court in Sperry never made any mention that the injured party's status could 
change because of the household exclusion and the potential reduced right of recovery. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff in Sperry never made this argument, and there is simply no support for 
Mrs. Shores's position that her case can be distinguished from Sperry because Liberty Mutual 
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maintains that the household exclusion applies. The existence or non-existence of the household 
exclusion doesn't make a difference. The fact remains that plaintiff in Sperry was attempting to 
recover under the bodily injury coverage of the policy for the negligence of her husband. As 
such, she was a third-party claimant and had no standing to bring an action against the insurer. 
Perhaps a more in-depth discussion of Mrs. Shores's status as an insured and injured 
party may be helpful. As mentioned above, Mrs. Shores may occupy both the position of a first-
party claimant under a contract theory because she is insured by Liberty Mutual, and she may 
also assume the position of a third-party claimant under a tort theory because her husband 
negligently caused her injury. Here, Mrs. Shores is clearly not asserting any of her contract rights 
in bringing the bad faith claim. Any contractual rights under the policy would be extended based 
on the payment of damages to those injured by Mrs. Shores's own negligence while operating her 
insured vehicle, or payment to her directly for injuries she sustained due to the negligence of an 
uninsured or underinsured operator of a motor vehicle. 
The present claim does not fit into these categories. A review of Mrs. Shores's 
counterclaim for declaratory relief shows that she occupies the position of third-party claimant. 
In the counterclaim, Mrs. Shores asserts that she was injured in a motor vehicle accident in which 
her husband, Mr. Shores, was driving, and that he was responsible for the injuries. Counterclaim 
at 4 (R.77). Mrs. Shores then demands payment under the liability coverage of the Liberty 
Mutual policy. Id. at 9 (R.72). Mrs. Shores is attempting to recover for her own personal 
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injuries under the liability coverage of the Liberty Mutual policy. The only way to recover 
liability coverage for the negligence of an insured is as a third-party claimant. 
The presence of the household exclusion in the Liberty Mutual policy makes no 
difference in this third-party/first-party analysis. Mrs. Shores correctly points out that Liberty 
Mutual only agreed to pay $25,000 in bodily injury coverage because of the household exclusion. 
This fact, however, does not in any way alter Mrs. Shores's third-party status. Liberty MutuaPs 
attempts to enforce the provision does not transform Mrs. Shores's standing from third-party to 
first-party. 
Mrs. Shores cites to Black v. Allstate Insurance Company, 100 P.3d 1163 (Utah 2004), in 
support of her argument that she is entitled to pursue her case against the insurer as a first party. 
Brief of Appellant Burdene Shores at 21 and 22. Mrs. Shores, however, misreads the facts and 
holding in Black. 
In Black v. Allstate, Chris Black was involved in an automobile collision with Shirl 
Gallagher. Black, 100 P.3d at 1165. Both parties alleged the other was at fault and both were 
insured by Allstate Insurance Company. In addition, both Black and Gallagher submitted claims 
to Allstate for their respective damages. Black subsequently filed a lawsuit against Gallagher and 
Allstate. Black's claim against Gallagher was that Gallagher was fully responsible for the 
accident and should therefore pay his property damage for the loss. On the other hand, "Black's 
claim against Allstate was that Allstate breached its fiduciary duty to fairly and in good faith 
represent Black's interests with respect to Gallagher's claim" against Black. Id. 
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In defending the lawsuit, Allstate argued that Black had no standing because Black was 
not a party to the Gallagher insurance contract and therefore the insurer owed no fiduciary duties 
to Black. In declining this argument, the Utah Supreme Court determined that Allstate 
mischaracterized Black's cause of action against the insurer. Id. at 1167. In reviewing Black's 
Complaint, the Supreme Court found that "Black does not take issue with Allstate's conduct in 
processing his claim against Gallagher. Rather, Black argues that Allstate breached the duties it 
owed to him in handling Gallagher's claim against him." Id. The Court therefore concluded that 
"[w]hen handling the Gallagher claim, Allstate acted in its capacity as Black's liability insurer . . 
. . Hence, Black properly asserted a cause of action against Allstate based on his own contractual 
relationship with Allstate . . . ." Id. 
Mrs. Shores claim is not analogous to Black. Unlike Black, Unior Shores is not asserting 
a claim for damages against Mrs. Shores for the automobile accident. Mrs. Shores is therefore 
not claiming that Liberty Mutual improperly handled a third-party claim against her under the 
policy. As a result, there is no privity of contract between Mrs. Shores and Liberty Mutual. 
In arriving at its holding, the Supreme Court in Black reaffirmed its holding in Sperry 
"that the plaintiff could not be considered a party to the insurance contract for purposes of her 
bad faith action against the insurer since the insurer, in this capacity as the liability insurer for the 
husband, owed her no contractual good faith duties to settle her claim." Id. The Supreme Court 
further concluded that Allstate's reasoning would be "correct with regard to its handling of the 
Black claim against Gallagher." Id. 
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As in Sperry v. Sperry and Rumley v. Allstate, 924 S.W.2d 448, a case relied on by 
Sperry, Mrs. Shores's claim is not based on the "benefits payable to her under the policy, but 
upon her husband's tort liability to her for his negligence." Rumley, 924 S.W.2d at 450. As a 
result, Mrs. Shores occupies the position of a third-party claimant in tort, and not as a first-party 
claimant asserting contractual rights. This is not a first-party claim or even a mixed claim as 
Mrs. Shores asserts. The undisputed facts show that it is a third-party claim that is directly on 
point with Sperry, and any attempts to distinguish her claim, or liken it to Black, are misguided. 
Consequently, Mrs. Shores's counterclaim for bad faith refusal to settle was correctly dismissed 
by the trial court. 
II. 
LIBERTY MUTUAL'S HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION DOES NOT 
VIOLATE SECTION 31A-21-308 OF THE UTAH CODE. 
Mrs. Shores argues in her Appellate Brief that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual because Liberty Mutual's policy violates Utah Code section 
31A-21-308. Brief of Appellant Burdene Shores at 23-32. Section 31A-21-308(1) states in 
relevant part, "[i]f the policy covers various risks, different limitations may be provided 
separately for each risk, if the policy clearly states that." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-308(1) 
(2004). Specifically, Mrs. Shores argues that Liberty Mutual was required to include a statement 
in the policy to the effect that "an insured, by being an insured" is a risk under the policy, and 
then list the household exclusion as a limitation for that risk. Brief of Appellant Burdene Shores 
at 25. 
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This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Mrs. Shores misconstrues the 
meaning of section 308(1). By various risks, the statute is referring to bodily injury, uninsured 
motor vehicle, personal injury protection, and other such risks. The household exclusion is not a 
differing risk, but is an exclusion to the liability coverage of the policy. This exclusion is the 
same as multiple other exclusions and limitations for liability coverage. These exclusions and 
limitations do not constitute other varying risks, and, as a result, Section 31 A-21-308(1) does not 
apply as Mrs. Shores contends. 
Furthermore, even if the household exclusion did constitute another risk, the policy is 
clear in setting forth that limitation, which is all that is required of section 31A-21-308(1). This 
section does not provide that the separate risk has to be in the declarations as Mrs. Shores would 
have the Court believe. Because the limitation is clear, the household exclusion would be valid 
even if 31A-21-308(1) applied.2 
III. 
LIBERTY MUTUAL'S HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION DOES NOT 
VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY. 
Burdene Shores argues that public policy, as found in case law and statutory law, 
prohibits the enforcement of the household exclusion in the Liberty Mutual insurance policy. 
2
 In arguing for the statement's inclusion, Mrs. Shores is asking this Court to read a new 
provision into the statute. The law clearly states, however, that a court is not permitted to write a 
new requirement into a statue. In re General Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 110 
P.3d 666, 673 (Utah 2004) (stating that a statute should be interpreted as written and therefore 
the court "decline[s] the invitation to write [a new] . . . requirement into the statute."). 
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Brief of Appellant Burdene Shores at 15-16, 23-50. A review of the law in this area shows that 
Mrs. Shores's public policy arguments are unfounded. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that '"[a]n insurer may include in a policy any number or 
kind of exceptions and limitations to which an insured will agree unless contrary to statute or 
public policy.'" Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 980 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1999) (quoting 
Gee v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 842 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)); See also Calhoun v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 96 P.3d 916 (Utah 2004). '" [T]he general judicial attitude toward 
insurance policies is to sustain them on grounds of public policy wherever possible.'" Id. 
(quoting Ross v. Producers Mut. Ins. Co., 295 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah 1956)). 
Because "[t]he nature and scope of what constitutes a 'clear and substantial' public policy 
. . . is not always easily discernible," the Supreme Court has provided a guide to assist in 
discerning what constitutes clear public policy. Rackley v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 23 P.3d 
1022, 1026 (Utah 2001). The Utah Supreme Court in Rackley stated that "public policy is 'clear' 
if it is plainly defined by one of three sources: (1) legislative enactments; (2) constitutional 
standards; or (3) judicial decisions." Id. at 1027. The household exclusion in the Liberty Mutual 
insurance contract is supported by all three. 
A, The Household Exclusion is Supported by Judicial Decisions from Utah and 
other States. 
One of the three criteria set forth in Rackley for the determination of public policy is the 
support of judicial decisions. Case law in Utah and in other jurisdictions support Liberty 
Mutual's household exclusion as valid and enforceable. 
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A review of judicial history in Utah demonstrates that the Appellate Courts will uphold 
exclusions in automobile policies so long as the statutory minimum coverages are satisfied. For 
example, the Utah Supreme Court held as follows in a 1980 opinion: 
[Contracting parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the minimum required 
limits, and the exclusion found in the contract is valid in relation to any coverage 
exceeding the minimum amounts. Thus, a balance is struck between the necessity 
of securing minimum automobile liability coverage and the availability of lower 
premiums because of the exclusion of high insurance risks. 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 619 P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 1980) (footnotes 
omitted). 
In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court decided Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 
231 (Utah 1985), where the court held that household exclusion clauses in automobile insurance 
policies are contrary to public policy and the no-fault statutes as to any amount at or below the 
minimum benefits established under the No-Fault Insurance Act. The Court declined to address 
the validity of the exclusion in excess of the statutory mandated minimums. 
In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court decided State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. 
Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987). In Mastbaum, Thomas and Kathleen Mastbaum were 
both insured under an automobile policy with State Farm Insurance. Mrs. Mastbaum was seated 
in the front passenger seat of her vehicle when she was severely injured in an accident while Mr. 
Mastbaum was driving. She subsequently filed a civil suit against Mr. Mastbaum alleging that he 
was intoxicated and negligent in operating the vehicle. Mr. Mastbaum tendered the case to State 
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Farm, who subsequently brought a declaratory action on the basis that the family exclusion 
relieved it from paying any judgment to Mrs. Mastbaum. 
The majority opinion in Mastbaum affirmed the validity of the State Farm household 
exclusion and held "that the household or family exclusion is valid in this state as to insurance 
provided by an automobile policy in excess of the statutorily mandated amounts and benefits." 
Mastbaum, 748 P.2d at 1044. Mrs. Shores, however, relies upon Justice Zimmerman's 
concurrence and Justice Durham's dissent in Mastbaum to argue that household exclusions 
written after 1986 are invalid under Utah Code section 31A-22-309. 
Contrary to Mrs. Shores's arguments, the concurring and dissenting opinions are not 
controlling. The Mastbaum decision is actually a plurality opinion. As such, it is not binding 
and does not establish any precedent for future cases. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 996 (Utah 
1995). In a later decision, this Court commented that the plurality decision in Mastbaum was 
dicta. Nat'I Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Moore, 882 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
Although not binding precedent, the majority opinion in Mastbaum recognized that the 
vast majority of cases throughout the country hold that household exclusions are enforceable 
with regard to policy amounts exceeding the statutory minimums. Id. at 1043-44 (and cases cited 
therein). The Court then concluded as follows: 
We adhere to . . . the majority view and hold that the household or family 
exclusion is valid in this state as to insurance provided by an automobile policy in 
excess of the statutory mandated amounts and benefits. While the minority view 
is attractive from the standpoint of an injured victim, the policy must be enforced 
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as written when its provisions do not conflict with our mandatory automobile 
insurance statutes. 
Id. at 1044. 
As mentioned in Mastbaum, the majority of courts, both before and after Mastbaum, have 
held that household exclusions in automobile policies are enforceable so long as the coverage is 
not reduced below the minimum financial responsibility insurance limits required by state law. 
A sampling of these decisions include the following: Coffman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 884 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1994); Smalls v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 32 (D.C. 
1996) ("[Hjousehold exclusion clauses have been upheld by the courts of many states when they 
have not been in conflict with statutory requirements.. . . [T]here is no bar to enforcement of the 
clause with respect to amounts greater than the minimum statutory requirements."); Georgia 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burch, 476 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Krause v. Krause, 589 
N.W.2d 721 (Iowa 1999); Halpin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1992); 
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Young, 832 P.2d 376 (Nev. 1992); Hartline v. Hartline, 39 P.3d 765 (Okla. 
2001); Hansen v. United Serv. Auto. Ass yn, 565 S.E.2d 114 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002); Cimarron Ins. 
v. Croyle, 479 N.W.2d 881 (S.D. 1992); Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 849 A.2d 
539 (Md. 2004); Pribble v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 933 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Wyo. 1997) 
('"The vast majority of cases . . . have held that household exclusions or analogous exclusions 
are enforceable with respect to policy amounts in excess of the statutory minimum . . . . ' " ) 
(citation omitted). 
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The judicial history in Utah also includes two Utah Supreme Court decisions which have 
upheld household exclusions on at least two occasions in insurance policies other than 
automobile policies. These decisions include National Farmers Union Property & Casualty 
Company v. Moore, 882 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1994), which affirmed a household exclusion in a 
farmowner's policy as valid and enforceable and not contrary to public policy, mdAllen v. 
Prudential Property & Casualty Company, 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992), which upheld a household 
exclusion in a homeowner's policy on grounds that it was unambiguous. 
Most recently, the Utah Supreme Court decided Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company in July of 2004. Calhoun, 96 P.3d 916. In that opinion the 
Supreme Court held as follows: 
[CJontrary to the Calhoun's assertions, exclusionary endorsements such as the 
"owned vehicle" exception at issue are not necessarily invalid. "Rather, 
contracting parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the minimum required 
limits, and [an] exclusion found in [a] contract [is] valid in relation to any 
coverage exceeding minimum amounts."[3] As long as any exclusions are phrased 
in "language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the insured the 
specific circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be provided," 
exclusions in insurance policies beyond the minimum coverage limits are 
allowed. [4] 
Id. 923-24 (citations omitted). Approximately one month later, the Utah Supreme Court also 
decided Speros v. Fricke, 98 P.3d 28, 44 n.8 (Utah 2004), where the Court likewise held that 
3Citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 619 P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 
1980). 
4Citing^//v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993). 
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"[contracting parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the statutory minimum 
requirements."5 
The trial court here correctly concluded that Calhoun sets forth the general rule of law 
governing exclusions in automobile policies, and that it was bound to follow that rule of law. 
Order and Final Judgment at 6-7 (R. 438-39). Based on this rule of law, the trial court correctly 
held that the household exclusion in the Liberty Mutual policy of insurance was a valid and 
enforceable provision limiting liability coverage under the policy. Id, at 7 (R.437). 
The underlying policy concerns behind household exclusions also support their 
enforcement. One of those policy objectives is to keep premiums lower by excluding an area of 
high risk. Allstate, 619 P.2d 329; Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 173 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Cal. 1981); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Feghali, 814 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1991). The courts have also held that household 
and family exclusions protect insurers from collusion among family members who pursue 
insurance claims and lawsuits. Cocking, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 846; Feghali, 814 P.2d at 863; 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 514 N.E.2d 595 (111. Ct. App. 1987); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. v. Butler, 904 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 443 S.W.2d 650, 651-52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). In addition, household exclusions protect 
families from the disrupting influence of litigation between spouses and other family members. 
5
 The Speros Court concluded that an intentional acts exclusion is valid in excess of the 
minimum liability limits mandated by statute. 
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Feghali, 814 P.2d at 863. These same policy concerns apply to the household exclusion at issue 
here. 
A review of the judicial history in Utah shows that the Utah Appellate Courts enforce 
exclusions in automobile polices so long as the statutory minimum amounts are preserved. In 
addition, the validation of family exclusions above the statutory minimums is consistent with the 
trend of authority from around the country. Accordingly, public policy as defined by judicial 
authority supports the enforcement of the household exclusion in the Liberty Mutual policy of 
insurance. 
B. The Household Exclusion is Supported by Legislative Enactments. 
The Utah Insurance Code establishes the requirements insurance carriers must meet when 
providing motor vehicle coverage to an insured. Relevant to this appeal is section 31 A-22-304 of 
the Code, which provides the statutory minimums for insurance coverage. Utah Code Ann. § 
31 A-22-304(l)(a) (2002). Specifically, this section states that an insurance policy may not limit 
the amount of motor vehicle liability coverage below "$25,000 because of liability for bodily 
injury to or death of one person, arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident." 
The language in the Liberty Mutual policy endorsement meets this minimum requirement. 
LibertyGuard Auto Policy (R.245). 
Mrs. Shores argues that there is no statutory approval for the household exclusion. Brief 
of Appellant Burdene Shores at 43. The clear inference from section 304(l)(a), however, is that 
insurance policies may limit liability coverage to greater than or equal to $25,000. Furthermore, 
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Section 31 A-1-102(7) of the insurance code states that the purpose of the code is to "maintain 
freedom of contract and enterprise." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102(7) (2002). Along these same 
lines, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "[a]s long as any exclusions are phrased 
in 'language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the insured the specific 
circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be provided,' exclusions in insurance 
policies beyond the minimum coverage limits are allowed." Calhoun, 96 P.3d at 923-24 
(quoting^// 850 P.2d at 1275). 
Contrary to the Shoreses' arguments, the above demonstrates that there is statutory 
authority supporting the household exclusion. On the other hand, the Shores have not identified 
any statutory provision which would prevent insurers from including household exclusions in 
their automobile policies.6 
As mentioned before in this Brief, Mrs. Shores relies on Justice Zimmerman's 
concurrence and Justice Durham's dissent in Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, to argue that household 
exclusions written after 1986 are invalid under Utah Code section 31A-22-309. Brief of 
Appellant Burdene Shores at 42-45. As mentioned previously, the opinion in Mastbaum is a 
plurality opinion and does not establish any precedent for future cases. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991; 
Moore, 882 P.2d 1168. 
In addition to the plurality not being binding law, a later amendment to the insurance code 
shows that Justice Durham's analysis would no longer be valid. In support of her opinion that 
6
 Liberty Mutual demonstrated in section II of this Brief that the household exclusion 
does not violate Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-308(1). 
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the legislature intended to invalidate all household exclusions, Judge Durham cited to the 
personal injury protection statute of the Utah Insurance Code, which only permits certain 
exclusions. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d at 1045-47. Because the accident occurred in 1981, Judge 
Durham relied on the personal injury protection statute before July 1, 1986. Id. (citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1985 Insurance Code Recodification pamphlet edition)). The only 
three permissible exclusions in this section included intentional acts, nonpermissive use, and 
injury sustained while occupying an owned, but not insured, motor vehicle. 
In 1986, the legislature added a significant subsection. The newly added paragraph (2)(b) 
states that the "provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which may be contained 
in other types of coverage." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(2)(b) (1986). The addition of 
subsection (2)(b) makes clear that 31 A-22-309 only applies to personal injury protection 
coverage. The coverage at issue in this appeal is liability coverage. By enacting subsection 
(2)(b), the legislature demonstrated that it had no intention of imposing the same limitations on 
exclusions for liability coverage. Accordingly, the plurality in Mastbaum would have come to a 
different result with the addition of paragraph (2)(b). 
In summary, there are no statutory grounds to invalidate the household exclusion. 
Adopting the Shoreses' arguments would require insurers to offer more than the minimum 
amounts under section 31A-22-304, a position rejected by Mastbaum. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d at 
1044 ("[A] statute has no effect upon insurance which it does not require."); Meyer v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 594 (Colo. 1984) (Rovira, J., dissenting) ("[Although 
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an insurance policy must comply with statutory requirements . . . a statute has no effect upon 
insurance which it does not require."). The above arguments demonstrate that the household 
exclusion in the Liberty Mutual policy is supported by legislative enactments, is not contrary to 
public policy, and should be enforced. 
C. The Household Exclusions is Consistent with the Constitutional Right to 
Contract. 
The Utah Constitution states that "[n]o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." Utah Const, art. I, §18. The Utah 
Supreme Court has further emphasized the importance of freedom of contract and the deference 
courts will give to this freedom. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998); 
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 52 P.3d 1179 (Utah 2002). In Bakowski, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a court cannot make a better contract for the parties than the one they 
made for themselves. Bakowski, 52 P.3d at 1185.7 In addition, a court will also not "avoid the 
contract's plain language to achieve an 'equitable' result." Id} Along these same lines, Utah 
courts have repeatedly held that an insurer is entitled to freely contract with their insureds as long 
as statutory requirements are met. Allstate, 619 P.2d at 329; Crook, 908 P.2d 685; Calhoun, 96 
P.3d 916; Speros, 98 P.3d 28. 
7
 See also Ryan, 972 P.2d 395 (finding that the law enables parties to freely contract; 
establishing terms and allocating risks between them, and the law even permits parties to enter 
into unreasonable contracts or contracts leading to hardship on one party.). 
8
 See also Utah Coal & Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 40 P.3d 
581, 584 (Utah 2001) (stating that "equitable relief should not be used to assist one in extricating 
himself from circumstances which he has created."). 
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Consistent with the law in Utah, Liberty Mutual's household exclusion is a valid attempt 
to limit coverage beyond the statutory minimum limits. Both Liberty Mutual and the Shores 
freely contracted for the insurance services provided. The Court cannot avoid the plain language 
of the exclusion to fashion what it views to be a more equitable result. The household exclusion 
in the Liberty Mutual policy should be affirmed as a valid and enforceable provision. 
D. The Household Exclusion Does Not Otherwise Contravene Public Policy. 
In arguing that the household exclusion violates public policy, Mrs Shores further relies 
on Farmers v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, and Meyer v. State Farm, 689 P.2d 585. Brief of Appellant 
Burdene Shores at 40-41. These cases, however, do not support Mrs. Shores's position. 
As mentioned above, the Farmers v. Call court invalidated a household exclusion to the 
extent that it did not provide the statutorily required minimum coverages set forth in the law. 
The Call court, however, "decline [d] to address . . . the validity of the household exclusion 
clause in excess of the statutory minimums" Call, 712 P.2d at 236 (emphasis added). Because 
the present case addresses coverage in excess of the statutory minimums, the holding in Call is 
irrelevant to whether Liberty Mutual's household exclusion violates public policy. 
In addition, Mrs. Shores relies on Call to argue that Liberty Mutual's agent was required 
to give them substantive notice of the household exclusion liability limits for insureds. Brief of 
Appellant Burdene Shores at 41. This argument has specifically been rejected by the Utah 
appellate courts. Allen, 839 P.2d 798; Moore, 882 P.2d 1168. In Allen v. Prudential, the 
insured's child was injured when a pot of boiling water spilled on him. After the accident, the 
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child's father made a claim against his homeowner's insurance seeking recovery for the 
accidental injury of the child. The insurer denied the claim based on a household exclusion in an 
endorsement to the policy which excluded coverage for any insured. Allen, 839 P.2d at 807. 
In a subsequent declaratory judgment action, the insured in Allen argued that the agent did 
not mention the household exclusion at the time the policy was sold. Id at 799. The facts 
further showed that the policy was delivered two months after the meeting between the insured 
and the agent. Similar to the arguments by Mrs. Shores here, the insured in Allen argued that the 
court should invalidate the household exclusion on the grounds that the insurance policy was an 
adhesion contract which violated the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage. 
In ruling against the insured, the Utah Supreme Court rejected all variations of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine under Utah law. Id. at 807; Moore, 882 P.2d at 1169; Alf, 850 
P.2d at 1275. The Court explained that the insured's theory would essentially 
allow a court to invalidate a clear provision of an insurance contract, even if the 
insured had not read it, if the finder of fact is convinced that the insurer's agent 
knew or should have known that the insured had expectations that contradicted 
the policy's language and that the agent created or helped to create those 
expectations. . . . [W]e decline to make such a change in Utah law. 
Allen, 839 P.2d at 804.9 
As in Allen, Mrs. Shores's argument that her reasonable expectations have not been met 
are unsupported by the law in Utah. The fact that Mr. Farnsworth did not mention the household 
9The Supreme Court further rejected the insured's argument that the household exclusion 
was ambiguous. Allen, 839 P.2d at 807. The Court held that the household exclusion clearly 
applied to the insured's son who was injured by the spill. 
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exclusion at the time of the sale has no bearing on the enforcement of the provision. The Utah 
Supreme Court has made clear that the language of the policy takes precedent over any 
expectation the agent helped to create. In addition, the fact that the household exclusion is 
included in an endorsement does not make it invalid or ambiguous. 
Next, Mrs. Shores relies upon the majority's discussion of public policy underlying the 
household exclusion in Meyer v. State Farm, 689 P.2d 585. Brief of Appellant Burdene Shores 
at 40-41. The Meyer case is a 1984 Colorado Supreme Court decision. The holding in Meyer 
that a household exclusion ran contrary to public policy was later rejected by Colorado's General 
Assembly. In fact, the General Assembly "legislatively repealed" Meyer by enacting a new 
section of the Colorado Revised Statutes. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Feghali, 814 P.2d 863, 865 (Colo. 
1991) (explaining subsequent repeal of the Meyer decision). Colorado's General Assembly made 
clear that Meyer's interpretation of legislative intent regarding household exclusions was flawed. 
Id. 
The Supreme Court decision in Feghali further held that exclusions in insurance policies 
for "coverage of claims made by a member of a household against another member of the same 
household . . . are in conformity with the public policy of this state." Id. Moreover, the Colorado 
Supreme Court concluded that the inclusion of household exclusions may "serve to benefit the 
public." Id. at 866. In reaching this conclusion, the Colorado Court looked to the California 
courts and noted the following: 
"The [California] Legislature reasonably may have concluded that the benefits to the 
public from automatically including 'family member' coverage in all automobile liability 
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policies were outweighed by the probable adverse consequences of such a rule. It is not 
unreasonable to suppose that substantial increases in premiums would be forthcoming if 
such coverage were declared mandatory. It may well have been a legislative concern that 
an increase in the costs of liability insurance might result in an appreciable increase in the 
number of uninsured drivers to the ultimate detriment of the general public." 
Id. (quoting Farmers Ins. Exch v. Cocking, 628 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1981)). 
IV. 
LIBERTY MUTUAL'S HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION IS UNAMBIGUOUS 
AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
A. The Household Exclusion is Clear and Unambiguous. 
The Shores also argue that Liberty Mutual's household exclusion is ambiguous for a 
number of reasons. Brief of Appellant Unior Shores at 14; Brief of Appellant Burdene Shores at 
32. "Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law" for the courts to decide. Alf, 
850 P.2d at 1274; Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 994 P.2d 824, 827 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Contrary to the Shoreses' arguments, a reading of the entire Liberty Mutual policy, including the 
household exclusion, reveals that it is straightforward and unambiguous. 
The Utah Supreme Court has offered guidelines for determining whether an insurance 
provision is valid. The law holds that insurance policies are interpreted according to the rules 
governing ordinary contracts. Crook, 980 P.2d 685; Alf, 850 P.2d 1272. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated that "[c]ourts interpret words in insurance policies according to their usually 
accepted meanings and in light of the insurance policy as a whole. Policy terms are harmonized 
with the policy as a whole, and all provisions should be given effect if possible." Crook, 980 
P.2d at 686 (citing Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992)). 
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Insurance policies are not ambiguous "simply because one party seeks to endow them 
with a different interpretation according to his or her own interests." Alf, 850 P.2d at 1274-75; 
Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Ambiguity is found "'if the terms used 
to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings.'" Alf, 850 P.2d at 1274 (quoting Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Contract terms may also be considered 
ambiguous if they contain "'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.'" Bakowski, 52 P.3d at 1184 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 
(Utah 1991) (quotations and other citations omitted)). 
The terms found in the Liberty Mutual insurance contract contain none of these 
deficiencies. The policy provides liability coverage of $100,000 each person and $300,000 per 
accident. LibertyGuard Auto Policy (R.256). This coverage is modified, however, by an 
exclusion in an endorsement to the insurance policy which clearly states as follows: "[w]e do not 
provide Liability Coverage for any 'insured' for 'bodily injury' to you to the extent that the limits 
of liability for this coverage exceed the applicable minimum limits for liability specified by Utah 
Code Ann. Section 31A-22-304." LibertyGuard Auto Policy (R.245). 
This section is clear in limiting the amount of motor vehicle liability coverage to $25,000 
when an insured spouse brings a personal injury claim against his or her insured spouse for 
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negligence.10 The provision is clear, does not omit terms, and is not subject to multiple 
meanings. Crook, 980 P.2d 685; Alf, 850 P.2d 1272. Contrary to the Shoreses' arguments, the 
language of the policy is not obtuse and confusing. Brief of Appellant Burdene Shores at 33; 
Brief of Appellant Unior Shores at 28. 
Mrs. Shores argues that the provision is particularly confusing to older, retired military 
personnel who are the target of Liberty Mutual's advertising campaign. Brief of Appellant 
Burdene Shores at 33. In making this argument, Mrs. Shores fails to explain why retired military 
people would be at a disadvantage from the rest of the population in understanding policy 
provisions. Logic indicates that the opposite is true: a person who has the intelligence and 
determination to achieve an honorable military career would likely be better equipped to read and 
understand technical documents. 
The Shores provide no legal authority to support their position that the household 
exclusion is ambiguous. The Shores either make arguments that have been rejected by the 
courts, or they argue that the language is obtuse. Liberty Mutual has, however, cited to several 
opinions throughout this Brief which have enforced household exclusions with language similar 
to that included in the Liberty Mutual policy of insurance.11 These opinions and the household 
10
 The Supreme Court of Tennessee recently upheld a household exclusion in an 
automobile policy which read, "[w]e do not provide liability Coverage for any 'insured' for 
'bodily injury' to you." Purkey v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 2005 WL 2402216 (Tenn. 2005) 
11
 Purkey, 2005 WL 2402216; Pribble, 933 P.2d 1108; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 516 A.2d 586 (Md. 1986); Croyle, 479 N.W.2d 881; Halpin, 823 
S.W.2d; Young, 832 P.2d 376; Coffman, 884 P.2d 275; Smalls, 678 A.2d 32; Burch, 476 S.E.2d 
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exclusion itself demonstrate that the provision is not ambiguous, and that a person of "ordinary 
intelligence and understanding" could "fairly and reasonably" understand the meaning of the 
exclusion. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw, 99 P.3d 796, 797 (Utah 2004). The trial court here 
was correct in determining that the provision "clearly and unmistakably communicates to the 
insureds the circumstances under which coverage will be limited under the policy." Order and 
Final Judgment at 6 (R. 438). 
B. The Household Exclusion is not Ambiguous because it reduces the Stated 
Coverage. 
The Shores argue that the household exclusion is ambiguous because it conflicts with the 
coverage set forth in the declarations of the Liberty Mutual policy. Brief of Appellant Burdene 
Shores at 32; Brief of Appellant Unior Shores at 23. This is the same argument that the insured 
made before the Utah Supreme Court in Alf v. State Farm, 850 P.2d 1272. In Alf, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that an exclusion is not ambiguous because it conflicts with the stated 
coverage in some way. Id. at 1275. The reasoning in ^ //'applies with equal force to the 
Shoreses' arguments: 
[T]he Alfs claim that the exclusion is inconsistent with the expected coverage and 
that the inconsistency creates an ambiguity in the policy. However, this logic 
would prevent application of any exclusion since exclusions are necessarily 
inconsistent with coverage. We decline to adopt a new definition of "ambiguous" 
that would render an exclusion invalid simply because it conflicts with the stated 
coverage in some way. 
Id 
62; Krause, 589 N.W.2d 721; Hartline, 39 P.3d 765; Hansen, 565 S.E.2d 114; Stearman, 849 
A.2d 539. 
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If the Shoreses' arguments on this point were adopted, every exclusion and limitation in 
an insurance policy would be ambiguous because they conflict with the stated coverage. The 
household exclusion here is a common and accepted provision applied to modify the stated 
coverage in the policy. The provision does not give rise to different or inconsistent meanings any 
more than any other policy exclusion or limitation. The law does not support the Shoreses' 
argument that the exclusion is ambiguous because it reduces the stated coverage. 
C. The Household Exclusion is not Invalid because it Appears in an 
Endorsement and not in the Policy Declarations. 
The Shores further argue that the household exclusion is unenforceable because it is not 
included in the declarations of the Liberty Mutual policy of insurance. Brief of Appellant 
Burdene Shores at 33-34; Brief of Appellant Unior Shores at 15. The Shores therefore contend 
that the household exclusion is hidden in an endorsement, and that they had no meaningful notice 
of the provision. Id. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court responded to this same argument in Fribble v. State Farm, 
933 P.2d at 1112-13. In Fribble, the court "approved an exclusion which did not appear on the 
declarations page, and found that all parts of the insurance contract require each other for 
complete meaning." Id. at 112 (citing Martin v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 894 P.2d 618, 621 (Wyo. 
1995)). The court further reasoned that the "Declarations Page obviously does not include the 
terms and conditions of the policy booklet," and that the "location of the 'household exclusion' 
in the policy booklet does not create any potential double meaning or ambiguity." Id. 
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The opinion of Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 530 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2000), is also instructive. In that decision, the claimant argued, and the trial court agreed, 
that the "exclusion was 'camouflaged' and 'unclear' because it was contained in an endorsement 
instead of in the body of the policy." Id. at 230. The Georgia appellate court held that the trial 
court decision was without merit, and that every insurance contract is to be '"construed according 
to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy and as amplified, extended, or 
modified by any rider, endorsement, or application made a part of the policy.'" Id. at 231 
(citation omitted). The court further stated that these "forms constitute the entire policy, 
including the declarations portion which is also identified." Id}2 
The alternative would place every insurer writing an insurance contract under a duty to 
predict what terms an insured arbitrarily deems so essential that they must appear on page one 
rather than page twenty-two. A review of the Liberty Mutual policy shows that there are many 
exclusions and limitations included in the policy that are not part of the declarations. It is not 
practical to mention each of these in the policy declarations, and it would diminish the 
significance of the declarations pages. 
The above rulings from Wyoming and Georgia are consistent with the law in Utah. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that "[p]olicy terms are harmonized with the policy as a whole, and all 
provisions should be given effect." Crook, 980 P.2d at 686. As mentioned before, the Utah 
12
"An insured who can read is required to read the policy and is presumed to have 
understood its contents." Coleman, 530 S.E.2d at 231. 
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Supreme Court previously validated a household exclusion in a homeowner's policy even though 
the exclusion was in an endorsement attached to the policy. Allen, 839 P.2d 798. As in Coleman 
and Pribble, the fact that the household exclusion in the Liberty Mutual policy is in an 
endorsement as opposed to the declarations does not mean that it is camouflaged and unclear: 
All parts of the Liberty Mutual policy require each other for complete meaning. The policy 
should be considered as a whole rather than isolating select provisions. 
To this end, the Liberty Mutual policy makes clear that it is to be read in its entirety. For 
example, the cover letter to the policy states as follows: ''Please read your policy and each 
endorsement carefully." LibertyGuard Auto Policy (R.271). Page one of the policy under 
"agreement" also states that the agreement is "subject to all terms of this policy." Id (R.269). In 
addition, the Endorsement in question states that "THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE 
POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY." Id (R. 245). Finally, the declarations pages 
refer to the Endorsements to the policy, including the Endorsement containing the household 
exclusion. Id. (R.255). 
For these reasons, the Court should decline to accept the Shoreses' argument that the 
household exclusion is unenforceable because it is not included in the declarations. The case law 
holds that the household exclusion is not invalid because it appears in an endorsement. The 
policy itself also shows that all provisions of the policy are to be read and considered. 
Accordingly, the household exclusion should be enforced in this case. 
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V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MRS. SHORES'S RULE 56(f) MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE TO 
CONDUCT ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY. 
The Shores finally argue that the trial court improperly refused to allow them to conduct 
discovery under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure before ruling on Liberty 
Mutual's motion for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment action. Brief of Appellant 
Burdene Shores at 46-47; Brief of Appellant Unior Shores at 30-31. Contrary to the Shoreses' 
arguments, the trial court was correct in denying Mrs. Shores's Rule 56(f) motion for several 
reasons. 
First, the Shores failed to follow the proper procedure in bringing a Rule 56(f) motion and 
requesting a continuance. Mrs. Shores raised the motion for the first time at the hearing on 
Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment, even though Liberty Mutual filed its motion 
several months before the hearing. Order and Final Judgment at 2 (R.442); Transcript of Hearing 
dated 12/10/04 at 2-3.l3 Rule 56(f) permits a party to request the continuance of a court's 
consideration of a motion for summary judgment to allow the party to conduct further discovery, 
if the party can demonstrate the need for an extension of time. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). To this 
end, Rule 56(f) requires the movant to "file an affidavit to preserve his or her contention that 
summary judgment should be delayed" and to "explain how the requested continuance will aid 
his or her opposition to summary judgment." Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 488 
13
 The hearing transcript improperly identifies Mr. Rice, Counsel for Liberty Mutual, as 
making the Rule 56(f) motion where it should be Mr. Whitmer. 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted). The Shores failed to follow this procedure and provide 
an affidavit to preserve their contention, or one that contained an explanation as to why the 
Shores could not "present by affidavit facts essential to justify [their] opposition." For this 
reason alone, the Rule 56(f) motion was properly denied. 
Second, no amount of discovery would have enabled the Shores to defeat Liberty 
Mutual's motion on the declaratory judgment claims. The central and material issue before the 
trial court was whether the household exclusion is a valid and enforceable provision under the 
law in Utah. The trial court correctly ruled that this was a legal issue to be decided by the court. 
Order and Final Judgment at 7 (R.437); Speros, 98 P.3d at 30 ("In reviewing coverage issues, we 
interpret the language of the . . . auto insurance policy in light of the requirements of Utah's 
motor vehicle insurance statutes . . . . [T]his review turns on questions of law . . . ."); Cannon, 
99 A P.2d at 827.14 In fact, the trial court disregarded all affidavits in deciding the legal issue 
presented. Order and Final Judgment at 7 (R.437). In setting aside these affidavits, the trial 
court determined that the Shoreses' allegations of misrepresentation and unfair marketing 
practices related to Mr. Shores's bad faith counterclaim, and that a decision on the counterclaim 
was not before the Court. Transcript of Hearing dated 12/10/04 at 48-54. 
The law provides that a motion for summary judgment can only be defeated by issues that 
are material to the case. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The question of Liberty Mutual's marketing 
14
 Cannon held that insurance policies are merely ordinary contracts. Whether a contract 
is ambiguous is a question of law. If a contract is determined to be unambiguous, its 
interpretation is also a question of law. 
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practices is immaterial to the legal question of whether the household exclusion is a valid and 
enforceable provision. Although the trial court did not consider it, the Affidavit of Liberty 
Mutual's insurance agent, Ryan Farnsworth, showed that Liberty Mutual teamed up with The 
Retired Enlistment Association to send direct mailers to its members. Affidavit of Ryan 
Farnsworth at 2 (R.387); Liberty Mutual Mailer (R.383). Mr. and Mrs. Shores received one of 
these direct mailers which explained that members of the Association could receive a savings on 
their automobile and homeowners insurance with Liberty Mutual. Id. 
There is nothing wrong or illegal about this marketing practice. In this Appeal, the 
Shores have failed to show why members of The Retired Enlistment Association would be more 
trusting or confused than the rest of the population, or why retired military people would be at a 
disadvantage in understanding policy provisions. Furthermore, the Shores fail to provide any 
support for their contention that Liberty Mutual took advantage of any heightened trust or 
confusion by members of this organization. The Shoreses' arguments in this regard are nothing 
but conjecture unsupported by the evidence. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
The third reason that the Rule 56(f) motion was properly denied is that there were no 
misrepresentations made as the Shores contend. Mrs. Shores alleges that Liberty Mutual's agent 
falsely represented to them that their coverage under the Liberty Mutual policy would be similar 
to the coverage provided under their current insurance with MetLife. Brief of Appellant Burdene 
Shores at 44. Even assuming that these statements were made, the representation would have 
been accurate because the coverages were $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident: the 
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same in both policies. LibertyGuard Auto Policy (R.256); Metlife Auto Insurance Policy 
(R.352). 
More importantly, the MetLife policy also includes a family exclusion similar to the 
household exclusion in the Liberty Mutual policy. Metlife Auto Insurance Policy (R.343, 349). 
This family exclusion provides that there is no bodily injury coverage "to you or any person 
related to an insured by blood, marriage, or adoption who resides in the same household." Id. 
Assuming this provision applied to the Shoreses' accident, the result would be the same as with 
the Liberty Mutual household exclusion: the exclusion would not permit Mrs. Shores to recover 
$100,000 in liability coverage due to her husband's negligence in causing the accident. 
Consequently, there is no misrepresentation by Mr. Farnsworth because the coverages, including 
the household exclusion, would have been the same. As such, no genuine issue exists as to 
whether the agent misrepresented the terms of the Liberty Mutual policy. Webster, 675 P.2d at 
1172 ("The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to 
support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion.") 
A fourth reason that the Rule 56(f) motion should have been denied is that the law in 
Utah does not impose upon an insurance agent the duties of disclosure that the Shores are 
arguing in this appeal. As mentioned previously in this Brief, any argument that the insurance 
agent had a duty to disclose the household provision has been declined by the Utah Appellate 
Courts. Allen, 839 P.2d 798; Moore, 882 P.2d 1168. In Allen v. Prudential the insurer denied 
the claim based on a household exclusion in an endorsement to the policy. Id. at 807. In a 
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subsequent declaratory judgment action, the insured argued that the court should invalidate the 
household exclusion because the agent did not mention it at the time the policy was sold. Id. at 
799. In ruling against the insured, the Utah Supreme Court explained that it would not "allow a 
i 
court to invalidate a clear provision of an insurance contract." Allen, 882 P.2d at 804. 
The fact that Mr. Farnsworth did not mention the household exclusion at the time of the 
sale has no bearing on the enforcement of the provision. Such a finding would require an agent 
at the time of sale to review every exclusion in an insurance policy: an unreasonable and overly 
burdensome request. 
Finally, the Shores allegations of non-disclosure and misrepresentation are further 
undermined by the fact that the Liberty Mutual policy of insurance was delivered to them shortly 
after it became effective on January 12, 2003. Affidavit of Ryan Farnsworth at 3 (R. 386). The 
Shores admit that they received the policy on or after January 16, 2003. Answer and 
Counterclaim at 3 (R.78). The insureds then had an obligation to review the insuring contract. 
Coleman, 530 S.E.2d at 231 ("An insured who can read is required to read the policy and is 
presumed to have understood its contents."); see also Allen, 882 P.2d 798. If the insureds then 
believed that there were any misrepresentations or misunderstandings, that issue could have been 
addressed upon review of the policy. At no time after the policy was delivered did the Shores 
contact Liberty Mutual with any questions or concerns about any of its provisions. Affidavit of 
Ryan Farnsworth at 3-4 (R. 386-87). The accident giving rise to this case happened nearly eight 
months after the Shores received the policy. Amended Complaint at 2 (R.17). 
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Based on the above, the Shores cannot now contend that an exclusion is invalid because it 
wasn't disclosed by the insurance agent at the time of sale. The Shores had an obligation to 
review the Liberty Mutual policy and a court cannot invalidate a clear provision even where the 
insureds failed to read it. The record of this case demonstrates that the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion in denying Mrs. Shores's Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance to permit 
Mrs. Shores to conduct further discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff and Appellee, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals affirm the Order and Final Judgment of the 
trial court dismissing Defendant Burdene Shores's counterclaim of bad faith, affirm the Order 
and Final Judgment of the trial court granting Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment on 
its declaratory judgment action, and affirm the trial court's decision denying Defendant Burdene 
Shores's Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance to conduct further discovery. Liberty Mutual 
further requests that the appeal of Unior and Burdene Shores be dismissed. 
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